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Wollschlaeger, a Patient’s Right to Privacy, 
and a Renewed Focus on Mental Health 
Treatment 
Chad A. Pasternack* 
In response to doctors pushing gun control agendas on patients, 
Florida enacted the Firearm Owners Privacy Act. The law, 
upheld by the Eleventh Circuit in Wollschlaeger v. Governor of 
Florida, protects patients from intrusive lines of inquiry 
unrelated to their treatment and from discrimination due to 
firearm ownership. While patients in Florida benefit greatly 
from the Firearm Owners Privacy Act, this note argues for more 
specific language in the law, which would parallel language in 
the Florida Mental Health Act (“Baker Act”). The proposed 
changes would limit inquiries into firearm ownership to 
instances where there is a substantial likelihood of serious 
bodily harm to the patient or others. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A young mother is concerned about a rash on her son, so she brings 
him to a pediatrician. Once inside the examination room, the doctor asks 
the mother a series of questions about her home, including whether she 
owns any firearms. Bewildered about and uncomfortable with this 
question, the mother refuses to answer and pleads with the doctor to 
focus on her son instead. The doctor frowns, and then he advises the 
mother that she will have thirty days to find a new pediatrician. 
To a physician, the aforementioned scenario may be a reasonable 
practice of preventive medicine. In fact, counseling patients on firearm 
safety is a practice encouraged by the American Medical Association.1 
But, the patient on the receiving end of the inquiry may feel vulnerable, 
threatened, and violated. Particularly when a patient goes to a doctor for 
a specific purpose, as opposed to for an ordinary wellness visit, it is 
presumable that the patient neither expects nor desires such intrusive 
inquiries in the name of preventive care. The physicians’ gun control 
movement is a result of excessive media coverage of mass shootings and 
inadequate treatment of the mentally ill.2 Instead of treating the root 
causes of gun violence, such as mental illness and breakdown of the 
family unit, “the public health establishment’s histrionic reflex is . . . to 
control and confiscate.”3 
In response to this movement among healthcare providers, Florida 
enacted a law that curtails doctors’ ability to question patients on 
ownership or possession of firearms and ammunition, which is known as 
                                                                                                             
1 Press Release, President Robert M. Wah, M.D., American Medical Association, 
AMA Response to Court Ruling on Florida’s Gun Gag Law (July 28, 2014). 
2 Vik Khanna, Why Public Health Needs a New Gun Doctrine, AMERICA’S 1ST 
FREEDOM, Dec. 2014, at 64. While Khanna, a public health professional educated at the 
Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Hygiene and Public Health, admittedly 
believes the Second Amendment secures the rights of individuals to own firearms and 
enjoys firearm ownership, he brings a level of fairness to the conversation by discussing 
data that typically goes unreported. For instance, he noted a 2013 report produced by the 
Institute of Medicine was ignored by the media. The report, ordered by the Centers for 
Disease Control, concluded that defensive uses of firearms occur more than previously 
recognized, firearm ownership is a crime deterrent, and unauthorized possession of a 
firearm is a crucial driver of gun related violence. Id. 
3 Id. 
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the Firearm Owners Privacy Act.4 Essentially, the law dictates limits on 
preventive medicine in regards to firearms. This note will show that the 
Firearm Owners Privacy Act is indeed a valid regulation of healthcare. 
To clarify, this note will not discuss the Second Amendment, gun 
control, or gun rights.5 
First, this note will explore the evolution of healthcare regulation. 
Part II will begin with a brief discussion of a few major developments in 
regulation at the federal level. In particular, regulations pertaining to 
tobacco usage and Medicare will be used to show how healthcare 
regulations came about and gained acceptance, and the faculty the 
federal government has to impose such regulations. Along with the 
development of regulations, the advancement and changing nature of 
healthcare itself will be discussed. This note will focus on how mental 
health treatment, using preventive medicine as a backdrop, has advanced 
since the mid-1900s. After discussing healthcare at the macro-level, this 
note will narrow its focus to regulations in Florida, namely the Baker 
Act6 and regulations of patient medical records. 
Second, there will be a thorough analysis of the Firearm Owners 
Privacy Act. Part III will include both an analysis of the plain text of the 
law and its legislative history. Then, this note will examine the 
implications of the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of the Act in 
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida. 
Third, this note will propose changes to the Firearm Owners Privacy 
Act based on its legislative history and the Baker Act. As enacted, the 
Firearm Owners Privacy Act fails to effectuate its intended purpose, 
which is to protect the rights of patients by prohibiting agenda-driven 
inquiries into firearm ownership.7 In particular, Section 790.338 should 
be amended so that the exception to the general prohibition of inquiry 
                                                                                                             
4 See infra Part III.B; 2011 Fla. Laws 112 (codified at FLA. STATS. §§ 790.338, 
381.026, 456.072 (2014)). 
5 For more information on these issues, see McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 
742 (2010) (holding the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is incorporated 
by the Fourteenth Amendment and applicable to the states); District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding the Second Amendment confers an individual right 
to keep and bear arms); Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(holding “the right to keep and bear arms includes the right to carry an operable firearm 
outside the home for the lawful purpose of self-defense”); Palmer v. District of 
Columbia, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, Case No. 1:09-CV-1482, 2014 WL 3702854 (D.D.C. 
July 24, 2014) (holding Washington D.C.’s complete ban on the carrying of firearms 
outside the home is unconstitutional); Julie Morgan, Back to the Basics: Restoration of 
Our Right to Keep and Bear Arms Through a National Reciprocity Act, 21 U. MIAMI BUS. 
L. REV. 223 (2013) (discussing the constitutionality and need for a national concealed-
carry reciprocity law). 
6 Florida Mental Health Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 394.451-394.47891 (2014). 
7 See infra Part III.B. 
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into firearm ownership requires a good faith belief that there is a 
substantial likelihood of harm, instead of only relevance to the patient’s 
medical care or safety. 
II. PRIOR REGULATION OF HEALTHCARE 
Like any regulatory scheme, the American healthcare system has 
developed slowly. If the regulations in effect today were unilaterally 
imposed overnight, rather than after years of piecemeal evolution, such 
regulations would have been rejected. But, “[s]light encroachments 
create new boundaries from which legions of power can seek new 
territory to capture.”8 Concurrent with the evolution of healthcare 
regulation, the very definition of “healthcare” has undergone change. A 
brief history of these developments will provide the necessary context for 
an analysis of our present state of healthcare regulation. 
A. A Brief History of Federal Healthcare Regulation 
In the mid-twentieth century, the federal government directed an 
unprecedented amount of its attention towards the nation’s healthcare. 
Two initiatives in particular were monumental in crafting our present 
healthcare system: the Surgeon General’s 1964 report on smoking and 
health, and the creation of Medicare and Medicaid. The former, a 
landmark step in policymaking, and the latter, landmark steps in social 
insurance, are prototypical of federal healthcare regulation. 
1. Surgeon General’s Report on Smoking and Health 
The government’s first major push in its effort to expand healthcare 
regulation began in 1964 with the Surgeon General’s report, Smoking 
and Health.9 The report opened with a simple question that held far-
reaching effects: “[I]s the use of tobacco bad or good for health, or 
devoid of effects on health?”10 Unlike today, the carcinogenic effects of 
smoking were not common knowledge in the 1960s, nor were they 
proven scientifically by reliable research methods. 
In the early pages of the report, the Surgeon General discussed the 
problem that plagues most scientific research—causality. Whereas 
finding a correlation is merely finding a relation between phenomena,11 
                                                                                                             
8 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 39 (1957). 
9 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SMOKING & HEALTH: REPORT OF THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964) 
[hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL REPORT]. 
10 Id. at 5. 
11 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 280 (11th ed. 2003). 
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causation is “an act or agency which produces an effect.”12 The report 
noted, “thoughts about causality in the realm of this inquiry were 
constantly and inevitably aroused in the minds of the members because 
they were preoccupied with the subject of their investigation—‘Smoking 
and Health.’”13 Causality was determined by analyzing the effect or non-
effect of tobacco on the user’s tissues, organs, and other qualities that 
may affect the user’s health, for better or worse.14 
Scientific methods aside, the importance of the report flows from its 
findings. It found that the habitual use of tobacco is primarily related to 
the addictive nature of nicotine.15 Average smokers had nine to tenfold 
increases in risk of developing lung cancer, and heavy smokers had 
upwards of a twenty-fold risk increase.16 The report stated its conclusion 
succinctly: “[o]n the basis of prolonged study and evaluation of many 
lines of converging evidence, the Committee makes the following 
judgment: Cigarette smoking is a health hazard of significant importance 
in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial action.”17 
Once presented with this conclusion, it was only a matter of time 
before Congress acted. That action came in 1965 in the form of the 
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.18 The Act made it 
unlawful “for any person to manufacturer, import, or package for sale or 
distribution within the United States any cigarettes the package of which 
fails to bear the following statement: ‘Caution: Cigarette Smoking May 
Be Hazardous to Your Health.’”19 While this warning brought public 
attention to the effects of cigarette smoking, the language was weak and 
limited only to the package itself. Accordingly, Congress enacted the 
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969,20 which required stronger 
language to be put on packaging. It prohibited advertising cigarettes on 
any medium of electronic communication that is regulated by the Federal 
Communications Commission.21 Additionally, it required annual 
reporting to Congress by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare 
regarding information and recommendations related to smoking,22 as 
                                                                                                             
12 Id. at 196. 
13 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 20. 
14 Id. at 21. 
15 Id. at 32. 
16 Id. at 31. 
17 Id. at 33. 
18 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 
(1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2012)). 
19 Id. § 4. 
20 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2012)). 
21 Id. § 6. 
22 Id. § 8(a). 
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well as annual reporting by the Federal Trade Commission of the 
effectiveness of cigarette labeling and current practices of advertising.23 
The aforementioned series of events set precedent for healthcare 
regulation. The Surgeon General conducted research and declared that 
the evidence revealed cigarette smoking to be a health hazard and matter 
of public concern.24 Within only a few years, the tobacco industry was 
being regulated by the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal 
Communications Commission, and the Secretary of Health, Education 
and Welfare.25 
2. Creation of Medicare and Medicaid 
The 1960s was a busy decade in the healthcare arena. In addition to 
combating the perils of smoking, Congress expanded access to healthcare 
by establishing Medicare and Medicaid through the Social Security 
Amendments of 1965.26 As originally enacted, Medicare provided health 
insurance for individuals who attained the age of 65 and were entitled to 
Social Security benefits or were qualified railroad retirement 
beneficiaries.27 Medicare coverage includes both hospital insurance and 
supplementary medical insurance. As for Medicaid, it was created to 
enable the States to provide medical assistance to “families with 
dependent children and of aged, blind, or permanently and totally 
disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to 
meet the costs of necessary medical services,” as well as rehabilitation 
and other services to help beneficiaries attain independence.28 
The Social Security Amendments of 1965 explicitly prohibit federal 
interference: 
Nothing in this title shall be construed to authorize any 
Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision 
or control over the practice of medicine or the manner in 
which medical services are provided, or over the 
                                                                                                             
23 Id. § 8(b). 
24 My discussion of the Surgeon General’s report and its effects on policy should not 
be interpreted as being critical of either the findings of the report nor of the legislative 
response. Neither of these matters is of concern to this note. Rather, the cigarette smoking 
legislation is a paradigm of how matters once not thought to be health concerns can 
quickly morph into leading health concerns, and how the legislative response can be 
broader in scope than the traditional components of healthcare, i.e., the doctor-patient 
relationship. 
25 Known today as the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 
26 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396v (2012)). 
27 Id. § 101. 
28 Id. § 121. 
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selection, tenure, or compensation of any officer or 
employee of any institution, agency, or person providing 
health services; or to exercise any supervision or control 
over the administration or operation of any such 
institution, agency, or person.29 
That said, this prohibition is more appropriately described as a 
prohibition of direct control over the practice of medicine. In other 
words, the ability to indirectly control is retained through the power to 
regulate: “The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be 
necessary to carry out the administration of the insurance programs under 
this title.”30 
Before proceeding into any further discussion of how healthcare is 
regulated through Medicare and Medicaid, this note must clarify that 
healthcare providers choose to accept Medicare and Medicaid, thereby 
agreeing to regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and 
Human Services.31 Even though hospitals and doctors are typically 
referred to as some variation of the phrase “healthcare provider,” they are 
businesses and businessmen, respectively. By not accepting Medicare 
and Medicaid, these healthcare providers would turn away a significant 
source of revenue. Therefore, it is persuasive for healthcare providers to 
accept Medicare and Medicaid and to submit to federal regulation. 
Because this discussion is meant to be a superficial exploration into 
Medicare and Medicaid, the only regulations that will be discussed are 
the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 
(“EMTALA”)32 and the use of diagnosis-related groups (“DRG”). 
EMTALA applies to “participating hospitals” that have “entered into a 
provider agreement under Section 1395cc,”33 which is the agreement to 
participate in and receive payments from Medicare. Therefore, in order 
to access the segment of the market that consists of Medicare patients, 
hospitals agree, pursuant to EMTALA, to provide a screening 
examination and stabilizing treatment to any individual who comes to the 
hospital’s emergency department, regardless of whether the individual is 
                                                                                                             
29 Id. § 102. 
30 Id. 
31 See Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125, 134 
(N.D. Ill. 1975) aff’d Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Mathews, 423 U.S. 975 
(1975) (“each individual physician and practitioner has the ability to choose whether or 
not to participate in the [Medicare] program. It is true that there will exist economic 
incentive or inducement to participate in the program. However, such inducement is not 
tantamount to coercion or duress”). 
32 Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012). 
33 § 1395dd(e)(2). 
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eligible for Medicare benefits.34 In order to enforce the requirements of 
the statute, it authorizes a civil money penalty of up to $50,000 and may 
exclude doctors from participation in Medicare and Medicaid programs 
for flagrant or repeated offenses.35 
A second type of regulation imposed on healthcare providers through 
Medicare is the use of a prospective payer system that reimburses 
hospitals based on diagnoses, not actual cost.36 By reimbursing hospitals 
through DRGs, which are classifications of different diagnoses and 
procedures, the government forces hospitals to match their costs to the 
expected reimbursement. 
Under cost-based reimbursement, each hospital was 
treated as a singular entity entitled to receive its unique 
costs of treating Medicare patients. In contrast, under 
DRG-based reimbursement, each hospital is treated as a 
member of a group and it is entitled to reimbursement 
only by virtue of its status as part of that group. Each 
hospital receives reimbursement for the average of a 
type of case in an average class of hospitals in an 
average location.37 
As a result, hospitals are incentivized to cut costs, which may occur at 
the expense of patients’ treatment. For example, reducing lengths of 
patient stays reduces costs, but also inhibits physicians’ abilities to 
monitor patient recoveries.38 Yet the incentives resultant from fixed 
reimbursement go beyond increasing efficiency. A hospital that cannot 
match its costs to the reimbursement would suffer a loss; and conversely, 
a hospital that can treat a patient for less than the prospective payment 
will turn a profit.39 Regardless of the wisdom of this tradeoff, the federal 
                                                                                                             
34 § 1395dd(a)-(b). This note is not critical of EMTALA. EMTALA saves lives. Yet, 
EMTALA is a prime example of how regulations can be imposed on healthcare providers 
by the federal government through healthcare providers’ acceptance of Medicare and 
Medicaid. 
35 § 1395dd(d). 
36 See David M. Frankford, The Complexity of Medicare’s Hospital Reimbursement 
System: Paradoxes of Averaging, 78 IOWA L. REV. 517, 570-71 (1993). 
37 Id. at 577. 
38 For a more thorough analysis of the effects of a prospective payment system on 
hospital behavior, see Martin F. Grace & Jean M. Mitchell, Regulation of Health Care 
Costs: The Implications of the Prospective Payment Reimbursement System, 2 U. FLA. J. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 125 (1989). 
39 Pamela H. Bucy, Health Care Reform and Fraud by Health Care Providers, 38 
VILL. L. REV. 1003, 1015 (1993) (arguing that DRGs have encouraged fraud, including 
cost shifting to non-Medicare patients, false reporting of costs, and false diagnoses of 
patients). 
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government, by being the insurer of such a large segment of the 
population, is able to place controls on hospital behavior so as to reduce 
its own costs. While the government cannot directly control the practice 
of medicine, its role as insurer gives it considerable influence over 
healthcare practitioners. By controlling the money, the government is 
able to regulate the process. 
B. Changing Definition of Healthcare 
Healthcare n: the field concerned with the maintenance 
or restoration of the health of the body or mind.40   
Webster’s published this definition in 1998. In 2004, Webster’s 
published the following definition: 
Healthcare n: the provision of medical and related 
services aimed at maintaining good health, especially 
through the prevention and treatment of disease.41 
As medical science continually improves, what we consider 
“healthcare” will continually change. For example, look to the use of 
antihistamines to treat allergies. Prior to the 1900s, little was known 
about allergic reactions.42 Over the course of a few decades, scientists 
learned how allergens affect the body. By the early 1940s, antihistamines 
were invented and administered. Side effects of these early drugs 
included sedation and dry mouth.43 While one can function with dry 
mouth, sedation is more inhibiting. Fortunately, by the 1980s, 
pharmaceutical companies were able to produce non-sedative 
antihistamines.44 In under a century, people went from experiencing 
unexplained physiological reactions to understanding that their reactions 
are caused by “allergies,” which can be treated with over-the-counter 
medication. 
In order to maintain the relevancy of how different areas of 
healthcare have developed, this note will only discuss the shift to 
preventive medicine and changes in mental health treatment. 
                                                                                                             
40 WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 882 (2d ed. 1998). 
41 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 867 (2d ed. 2004). 
42 M.B. Emanuel, Histamine and the Antiallergic Antihistamines: A History of Their 
Discoveries, 29 CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ALLERGY, 1 (Supp. 3 1999). 
43 Id. at 9. 
44 Id. 
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1. Preventive Medicine 
Stated simply, preventive medicine is a mixture of science and 
philosophy that encourages patients to be proactive in maintaining their 
health. Instead of merely treating conditions as they occur, practitioners 
of preventive medicine are more forward looking in their approach to 
patient treatment. By treating conditions sooner or by controlling risk 
factors, health outcomes improve and costs decrease. 
Preventive medicine can be broken down into three levels: primary 
prevention, secondary prevention, and tertiary prevention.45 At the 
primary prevention level, the goal is to keep new problems from 
developing. This can be accomplished through the use of vaccines and 
immunization programs, or by making lifestyle changes, such as 
exercising, quitting smoking, and reducing alcohol consumption. 
Preventive medicine is always forward looking—lose weight and stop 
smoking now to reduce the risk of developing heart disease later. 
Despite a patient’s best efforts, some conditions are not preventable. 
But, with secondary prevention, conditions can be detected early and 
treated promptly.46 Wellness visits to physicians are encouraged because 
many conditions are asymptomatic.47 Examples of conditions that are 
commonly detected and treated at this stage of care are breast cancer, 
hypertension, high cholesterol, and skin cancer.48 Unlike the primary 
prevention stage, the goal here is to prevent the condition from 
advancing to a point where it causes health to deteriorate. 
Along the same lines, the objective of tertiary prevention is to 
prevent existing conditions from worsening, often through treatment, 
rehabilitation, or surgery.49 Although there is much debate over whether 
this is in fact preventive medicine and not purely reactive medicine, the 
conditions dealt with are typically progressive, so the focus remains on 
the future.50 
2. Mental Health 
Over the past half-century, the mental health system in the United 
States has undergone a dramatic transformation. Prior to the 1960s, 
mental health treatment consisted, in large part, of detention in state 
                                                                                                             
45 William Rakowski, The Definition and Measurement of Prevention, Preventive 





50 See id. 
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mental hospitals,51 otherwise known as asylums. During the 
deinstitutionalization movement that took place between 1955 and 1980, 
over 400,000 people were released from mental hospitals.52 Afterwards, 
attention turned to community support programs, which had goals of 
continuous community treatment and support services, as well as 
assertive crisis and outreach services.53 Instead of focusing on 
containment and restraint, the newer system emphasized rehabilitation. 
Patients were taught social skills and skills that support independent 
living and employment.54 
By the 1990s, the mental health system transformed again, this time 
to focus on recovery. “Central to recovery principles is the idea that 
people can live meaningful and personally satisfying lives without the 
complete elimination of psychiatric symptoms.”55 Because the current 
focus is on helping patients recover, healthcare providers and related 
organizations spend large amounts on outreach initiatives so that more 
people seek and receive treatment.56 A study of data from the Veterans 
Health Administration from 1997 to 2005 shows a significant increase in 
usage of mental health services. During that period, there was a 7% 
annual growth in usage,57 and the number of veterans who received at 
least one mental health contact increased 117.6%.58 
The current mental health landscape involves three main changes: (1) 
focusing on health rather than illness,59 (2) reducing negative stigmas 
associated with mental health treatment,60 and (3) increasing 
collaboration between primary care and mental health.61 Together, these 
changes are designed to make mental health treatment both more 
accessible to more people and to make more people willing to seek and 
                                                                                                             
51 Catherine H. Stein et al, Mental Health System Historians: Adults with 
Schizophrenia Describe Changes in Community Mental Health Care Over Time, 85 





56 Eric D. A. Hermes et al, Recent Trends in the Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder and Other Mental Disorders in the VHA, PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 471, 472 (May 
2012). 
57 Id. at 471. 
58 Id. at 472. 
59 A. Kathryn Power, Focus on Transformation: A Public Health Model of Mental 
Health for the 21st Century, 60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 580 (May 2009). 
60 Eric R. Pedersen & Andrew P. Paves, Comparing Perceived Public Stigma and 
Personal Stigma of Mental Health Treatment Seeking in a Young Adult Sample, 219 
PSYCHIATRY RES. 143 (2014). 
61 Stephen Petterson et al, Mental Health Treatment in the Primary Care Setting: 
Patterns and Pathways, 32 FAMILIES, SYSTEMS, & HEALTH 157 (June 2014). 
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receive treatment. The focus on health, rather than illness, and the goal of 
reducing negative stigmas are part of an attitudinal change in medicine, 
which corresponds closely to the rise in preventive medicine. The 
modern healthcare attitude, which is gaining acceptance, is that going to 
a doctor should be a routine part of life and that doing so allows us to 
live better and longer. 
C. Regulation in Florida 
Our discussion thus far has been on healthcare at the national level. 
Most healthcare regulation, however, is imposed at the state level.62 In 
Florida, most laws regulating healthcare can be found in Title XXIX, 
Public Health, and Title XXXII, Regulation of Professionals and 
Occupations, of the Florida Statutes. This note will limit its discussion to 
those statutes pertaining to mental health treatment and medical records. 
1. The Baker Act 
The Florida Mental Health Act, more commonly known as the Baker 
Act, establishes the state’s goals and policies for mental health 
treatment.63 In passing the Baker Act, it was “the intent of the 
Legislature . . . to evaluate, research, plan and recommend . . . programs 
designed to reduce the occurrence, severity, duration, and disabling 
aspects of mental, emotional, and behavioral disorders.”64 There is a 
clear policy favoring medical treatment, rather than pre-
deinstitutionalization-style containment. 
Treatment programs “shall include, but [are] not limited to, 
comprehensive health, social, educational, and rehabilitative services to 
persons requiring intensive short-term and continued treatment in order 
to encourage them to assume responsibility for their treatment and 
recovery.”65 The goal is to help patients recover and lead meaningful 
lives. But, that can be a difficult goal to attain considering that many 
suffering from mental health conditions either go undiagnosed or will not 
consent to treatment. In such circumstances, it is the intent of the 
Legislature 
that any involuntary treatment or examination be 
accomplished in a setting which is clinically appropriate 
and most likely to facilitate the person’s return to the 
community as soon as possible; and that individual 
                                                                                                             
62 See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
63 Florida Mental Health Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 394.451-394.47891 (2014). 
64 FLA. STAT. § 394.453 (2014). 
65 Id. 
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dignity and human rights be guaranteed to all persons 
who are admitted to mental health facilities or who are 
being held [for involuntary examination].66 
Yet, even when treating or examining an involuntary patient, restraint 
and seclusion is justified only in response to imminent danger to the 
patient or others.67 
Along the same vein of legislation geared towards the treatment of 
communicable diseases, the Baker Act recognizes the competing 
interests of the patient and the public in mental health treatment: (1) the 
patient recovering and functioning in society, and (2) protecting the 
public from people who are dangerous due to their mental illnesses. 
Mental health is defined as a person’s “state of mind characterized by 
emotional well-being, good behavioral adjustment, relative freedom from 
anxiety and disabling symptoms, and a capacity to establish constructive 
relationships and cope with the ordinary demands and stresses of life.”68 
Treatment, on the other hand, is “the administration of appropriate 
measures (e.g., drugs, surgery, therapy) that are designed to relieve a 
pathological condition.”69 Therefore, the missing component of the 
equation is mental illness. The Baker Act defines mental illness as “an 
impairment of the mental or emotional processes that exercise conscious 
control of one’s actions or of the ability to perceive or understand reality, 
which impairment substantially interferes with the person’s ability to 
meet the ordinary demands of living.”70 However, developmental 
disabilities, intoxication, and conditions manifested only by antisocial 
behavior71 or substance abuse are not included as mental illnesses. 
As previously discussed, EMTALA requires hospitals that have 
entered into Medicare provider agreements to provide stabilizing 
treatment to all individuals who enter the hospital’s emergency 
department, regardless of their ability to pay.72 The value society places 
on human life is greater than the value it places on emergency stabilizing 
                                                                                                             
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 568 (1st ed. 
2007) [hereinafter APA DICTIONARY]. 
69 Id. at 956. 
70 FLA. STAT. § 394.455(18) (2014). 
71 Antisocial behavior is defined as “aggressive, impulsive, and sometimes violent 
actions that violate the established rules, conventions, and codes of a society, such as the 
laws upholding personal and property rights.” APA DICTIONARY, supra note 68, at 62. 
72 See supra Part II.A.2. 
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treatment.73 Like EMTALA, the Baker Act grants patients the right to 
treatment. “A person shall not be denied treatment for mental illness and 
services shall not be delayed at a receiving or treatment facility because 
of inability to pay.”74 But, after mental health services are provided, 
hospitals are entitled to make every reasonable effort to collect 
appropriate reimbursement—they simply cannot condition treatment on 
payment.75 Particularly because people with mental illnesses may be a 
danger to themselves or others, public policy dictates that they receive 
prompt treatment. 
Dangerous mentally ill patients, however, do not always seek 
treatment when they should. Accordingly, the Baker Act provides for 
involuntary examination and placement. A person can be compelled to 
undergo examination if, 
[w]ithout care or treatment, the person is likely to suffer 
from neglect or refuse to care for himself or herself; such 
neglect or refusal poses a real and present threat of 
substantial harm to his or her well-being; and it is not 
apparent that such harm may be avoided through the 
help of willing family members or friends or the 
provision  of other services; or . . . [t]here is a substantial 
likelihood that without care or treatment the person will 
cause serious bodily harm to himself or herself or others 
in the near future, as evidenced by recent behavior.76 
An involuntary examination is a drastic measure, but it is a necessary 
step to save lives, i.e., it is the preliminary step to involuntary placement. 
A person may be placed in involuntary inpatient placement if “[t]here is 
substantial likelihood that in the near future he or she will inflict serious 
bodily harm on himself or herself or another person, as evidenced by 
recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening such harm.”77 People 
                                                                                                             
73 Therefore, providing a patient emergency treatment for mental illness is the 
functional equivalent of providing life-saving treatment to a patient in an emergency 
department. In effect, they are both lifesaving measures. 
74 FLA. STAT. § 394.459 (2014). 
75 § 394.459(2)(a). 
76 FLA. STAT. § 394.463(1)(b) (2014). The statute also requires that either the person 
refused examination after conscientious disclosure of the purpose of examination, or the 
person is unable to determine for himself or herself whether the examination is necessary. 
§ 394.463(1)(a). 
77 FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1)(a) (2014). In addition, criteria for involuntary inpatient 
placement requires the person be mentally ill, and refuse or be unable to determine 
whether voluntary placement is necessary. Instead of a substantial likelihood of inflicting 
harm, a person may be placed in involuntary placement if he or she is manifestly 
incapable of surviving alone or with the help of family and friends. In all circumstances, 
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who continually exhibit behavior that qualifies them for involuntary 
inpatient placement may be placed into involuntary outpatient 
placement.78 While the Baker Act does have the “teeth” necessary to 
protect mentally ill patients from inflicting harm on themselves or others, 
its ultimate goal remains helping patients recover.79 
2. Patient Records 
Under Florida law, a patient’s medical records are confidential.80 The 
information contained in medical records is personal, and by prohibiting 
disclosure, the patient’s privacy, along with the sanctity of the doctor-
patient relationship, is protected. Without privacy protections, patients 
may be reluctant to seek treatment or be forthright with their doctors, for 
fear that third parties may stumble upon that information. Accordingly, 
in Florida, medical “records may not be furnished to, and the medical 
condition of a patient may not be discussed with, any person other than 
the patient, the patient’s legal representative, or other health care 
practitioners and providers involved in the patient’s care or treatment, 
except upon written authorization from the patient.”81 
In spite of the need to protect the privacy of patients, there are 
exceptions to the rule. For instance, medical records may be disclosed 
without written authorization to “any person, firm, or corporation that 
has procured or furnished such care or treatment with the patient’s 
consent”82; when compulsory physical examination is made during the 
course and scope of litigation83; “[i]n any civil or criminal action, unless 
otherwise prohibited by law, upon the issuance of a subpoena from a 
court of competent jurisdiction and proper notice to the patient or the 
patient’s legal representative by the party seeking such records”84; or to a 
healthcare provider’s attorney in a medical negligence action.85 
Whether the purposes of the exceptions to the rule are for economic 
and judicial efficiency or because they present equitable solutions, the 
effect is that patient records may be disclosed without authorization and 
over the objection of the patient. Even though patients have relatively 
strong federal privacy protections regarding their medical records, under 
                                                                                                             
all available less restrictive alternatives must have been judged to be inappropriate. See 
§ 394.467(1). 
78 FLA. STAT. § 394.4655 (2014). 
79 See FLA. STAT. § 394.4573 (2014). 
80 See FLA. STAT. § 456.057 (2014). 
81 § 456.057(7). 
82 § 456.057(7)(a)(1). 
83 § 456.057(7)(a)(2). 
84 § 456.057(7)(a)(3). 
85 § 456.057(7)(a)(d). 
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Florida law, they face the risk, in certain circumstances, of having their 
medical records disclosed to third-parties. 
III. FIREARM OWNERS PRIVACY ACT 
On June 2, 2011, Florida Governor Rick Scott signed the Firearm 
Owners Privacy Act into law.86 The law, often referred to as the “Docs 
vs. Glocks” law, protects patients’ privacy by restricting inquiry into 
firearm ownership and prohibiting discrimination by physicians against 
patients due to firearm ownership.87 Four days after being signed into 
law, several physicians’ groups initiated litigation seeking an injunction 
to enjoin enforcement and a declaration that the law is unconstitutional.88 
Thereafter, the district court issued its opinion in Wollschlaeger v. 
Farmer (the “District Court Opinion”), enjoining the State from 
enforcing the majority of the law.89 
In the District Court Opinion, the court noted “as part of the practice 
of preventive medicine, practitioners routinely ask and counsel patients 
about a number of potential health and safety risks, including household 
chemicals, swimming pools, drugs, alcohol, tobacco, and firearms.”90 For 
this reason, both the American College of Physicians and its Florida 
chapter argued that a physician has an obligation to provide preventive 
injury counseling on firearm safety.91 
Ultimately, the court granted the plaintiffs’ injunction based on its 
finding that the Firearm Owners Privacy Act is unconstitutional due to 
vagueness.92 The constitutionality of the Firearm Owners Privacy Act, 
however, was upheld on appeal, and the District Court Opinion was 
reversed.93 Consequently, the focus of this note will be on the 
effectiveness of the law—not its constitutionality. 
A. Language of the Act 
By enacting the Firearm Owners Privacy Act, the Florida Legislature 
created or amended three statutes: Section 790.338, Medical privacy 
concerning firearms, prohibitions, penalties, exceptions; Section 
                                                                                                             
86 2011 Fla. Laws 112. 
87 See infra Parts III.A, C. 
88 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. 
Supp. 2d 1251 (S.D. Fla. 2012). 
89 Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1270 (S.D. Fla. 2012). 
90 Id. at 1257. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 1267-69. 
93 See infra Part III.C. 
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381.026, Florida Patient’s Bill of Rights and Responsibilities; and 
Section 456.072, Grounds for discipline, penalties, enforcement.94 
First, Section 790.338, although grounded in the actions of 
healthcare practitioners, is located in Chapter 790 of the Florida Statutes, 
which is entitled “Weapons and Firearms.”95 If a significant portion of 
the Act is located in the chapter on Weapons and Firearms, then is the 
law a regulation of healthcare or a regulation of firearms? Despite the 
location of the restrictions on physician conduct in the Florida Statutes, 
the statute is a regulation of healthcare. This note contends that the 
deliberate placement of this part of the Firearm Owners Privacy Act was 
a strategic decision to emphasize the rights of firearm owners as 
patients—the majority of the Act is patient-centric—and not merely to 
dictate what healthcare providers can or cannot do. 
Section 790.338 begins by prohibiting healthcare providers and 
facilities from “intentionally [entering] any disclosed information 
concerning firearm ownership into the patient’s medical record if the 
practitioner knows that such information is not relevant to the patient’s 
medical care of safety, or the safety of others.”96 The central theme of the 
statute is relevance. If the information is not relevant, then it need not be 
entered into a patient’s medical records. Considering that patient medical 
records may, under certain circumstances, be disclosed without the 
patient’s authorization, Section 790.338(1) protects the patient’s privacy 
in personal information unrelated to his or her treatment. 
Next, Section 790.338 instructs healthcare providers on making 
inquiries into firearm ownership and possession: 
(2) A health care practitioner licensed under chapter 
456 or a health care facility licensed under chapter 395 
shall respect a patient’s right to privacy and should 
refrain from making a written inquiry or asking 
questions concerning the ownership of a firearm or 
ammunition by the patient or by a family member of the 
patient, or the presence of a firearm in a private home or 
other domicile of the patient or a family member of the 
patient. Notwithstanding this provision, a health care 
practitioner or health care facility that in good faith 
believes that this information is relevant to the patient’s 
medical care or safety, or the safety of others, may make 
such a verbal or written inquiry. 
                                                                                                             
94 2011 Fla. Laws 112. 
95 FLA. STAT. Chapter 790 (2014). 
96 FLA. STAT. § 790.338(1) (2014). 
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(3) Any emergency medical technician or paramedic 
acting under the supervision of an emergency medical 
services medical director under chapter 401 may make 
an inquiry concerning the possession or presence of a 
firearm if he or she, in good faith, believes that 
information regarding the possession of a firearm by the 
patient or the presence of a firearm in the home or 
domicile of a patient or a patient’s family member is 
necessary to treat a patient during the course and scope 
of a medical emergency or that the presence or 
possession of a firearm would pose an imminent danger 
or threat to the patient or others.97 
Upon reading subsection (2), one is left to ponder, what does it mean to 
have a good faith belief that information regarding firearm ownership or 
possession is relevant to a patient’s medical care or safety, or the safety 
of others? The juxtaposition of these two subsections enables application 
of the interpretive maxim noscitur a sociis—“a word may be known by 
the company it keeps.”98 Subsection (3) uses the phrase “a firearm would 
pose an imminent danger or threat to the patient or others.”99 By 
choosing to use this phrase in subsection (3) but not in subsection (2), the 
Legislature must have decided that an “imminent danger or threat to the 
patient or others” is not a necessary prerequisite for a healthcare provider 
to have a good faith belief that an inquiry is relevant to a patient’s 
medical care or safety. So, what is necessary? If a physician maintains a 
generalized belief that firearms are dangerous and are a threat to the 
patient’s and others’ safety, may the physician make the inquiry? What if 
the physician does not maintain such a generalized belief, but instead, 
treats a clumsy patient? May the physician, concerned that the clumsy 
patient will unintentionally discharge a firearm, make the inquiry then? 
The remainder of Section 790.338 is less troublesome in interpreting: 
(4) A patient may decline to answer or provide any 
information regarding ownership of a firearm by the 
patient or a family member of the patient, or the 
presence of a firearm in the domicile of the patient or a 
family member of the patient. A patient’s decision not to 
answer a question relating to the presence or ownership 
of a firearm does not alter existing law regarding a 
physician’s authorization to choose his or her patients. 
                                                                                                             
97 §§ 790.338(2)-(3). 
98 Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 519 (1923). 
99 § 790.338(3). 
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(5) A health care practitioner licensed under chapter 
456 or a health care facility licensed under chapter 395 
may not discriminate against a patient based solely upon 
the patient’s exercise of the constitutional right to own 
and possess firearms or ammunition. 
(6) A health care practitioner licensed under chapter 
456 or a health care facility licensed under chapter 395 
shall respect a patient’s legal right to own or possess a 
firearm and should refrain from unnecessarily harassing 
a patient about firearm ownership during an 
examination. 
(7) An insurer issuing any type of insurance policy 
pursuant to chapter 627 may not deny coverage, increase 
any premium, or otherwise discriminate against any 
insured or applicant for insurance on the basis of or upon 
reliance upon the lawful ownership or possession of a 
firearm or ammunition or the lawful use or storage of a 
firearm or ammunition. Nothing herein shall prevent an 
insurer from considering the fair market value of 
firearms or ammunition in the setting of premiums for 
scheduled personal property coverage.100 
In effect, the preceding subsections create a “protected class” of firearm 
owners in terms of how healthcare providers may treat them. Like an 
employment relationship, a physician may terminate the doctor-patient 
relationship at will. In spite of the at-will nature of the relationship, 
doctors are no longer free to use firearm ownership as a cause for 
termination of the relationship.101 Further, because of the discrimination 
provision, doctors may not charge firearm owners more, make firearm 
owners wait longer, limit the days in which firearm owners may schedule 
appointments, or carry out any other discriminatory practices against 
firearm owners. 
Subsection (6) leaves some room for the imagination. It deals with 
unnecessary harassment, so unlike the subsections before it, it does not 
                                                                                                             
100 §§ 790.338(4)-(7). 
101 Admittedly, this is a somewhat inaccurate statement of the law. See Wollschlaeger 
v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1264-65 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (“the State itself 
acknowledges that the law does not prevent a physician from terminating the doctor-
patient relationship”). It does not alter existing law pertaining to termination of the 
doctor-patient relationship, but by terminating the relationship because of firearm 
ownership, the doctor is subject to discipline. By being subject to discipline, the doctor 
can terminate the relationship, but is not free to do so. 
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necessarily pertain to inquiry. By its language, it is not clear if the 
subsection prohibits anything, or is merely a recommendation. In the 
former clause,102 the term “shall” is used, which means “[h]as a duty to; 
more broadly, is required to.”103 On the other hand, the latter clause104 
uses the term “should,” which does not possess significant legal meaning 
and is not defined in Black’s Law Dictionary.105 Was this merely an 
oversight on the part of the drafters, or was it their intention that the 
latter clause be a recommendation? 
As for subsection (7), the Legislature foreclosed on any argument 
that firearm ownership makes a firearm owner an inherently riskier 
candidate for insurance. The Legislature then concluded Section 790.338 
with subsection (8), which designates violations of subsections (1)-(4) as 
grounds for discipline.106 
Second, Section 381.026, the Florida Patient’s Bill of Rights and 
Responsibilities,107 was amended to add several provisions 
complementary to those already discussed. If the amendment of Chapter 
790 left any doubt that the Firearm Owners Privacy Act is a regulation of 
healthcare, the amendment of Section 381.026 should eliminate that 
uncertainty. Subsections (2), (4), (5), and (6) of Section 790.338 have 
counterparts in Section 381.026, wherein they are subsections (8), (9), 
(10), and (11), respectively.108 
Third, Section 456.072 was amended to give teeth to the Firearm 
Owners Privacy Act. Now, violations of any of the provisions of Section 
790.338 constitute grounds for discipline.109 
B. Legislative History 
Recall the earlier hypothetical in which a young mother who refused 
to answer a pediatrician’s question about firearm ownership was told to 
find a new doctor.110 A similar scenario unfolded in Ocala, Florida.111 
                                                                                                             
102 § 790.338(6) (“A health care practitioner licensed under chapter 456 or a health care 
facility licensed under chapter 395 shall respect a patient’s legal right to own or possess a 
firearm”) (emphasis added). 
103 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1585 (10th ed. 2014). 
104 § 790.338(6) (“A health care practitioner licensed under chapter 456 or a health care 
facility licensed under chapter 395 . . . should refrain from unnecessarily harassing a 
patient about firearm ownership during an examination.”) (emphasis added). 
105 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
106 § 790.338(8). 
107 Florida Patient’s Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, FLA. STAT. § 381.026 (2014). 
108 §§ 381.026(8)-(11) (2014). 
109 FLA. STAT. § 456.072(1)(mm) (2014). 
110 Supra Part I. 
111 See Health & Human Servs. Comm., Fla. H.R. Staff Analysis, H.R. 0155C, at 2 
(Apr. 7, 2011). 
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There, a pediatrician asked a patient’s mother whether there were 
firearms in her home. When she refused to answer, the doctor advised 
her that she had thirty days to find a new pediatrician, and that he asks all 
of his patients about their firearm ownership in order to provide safety 
advice. After receiving much media attention, the incident in Ocala “led 
many to question whether it should be an accepted practice for a doctor 
to inquire about a patient’s firearm ownership.”112 As noted in the 
District Court Opinion, many physicians groups encourage inquiry into 
patients’ firearm ownership.113 According to legislative findings, the 
American Medical Association recommends its members inquire as to 
the presence of firearms in the home and educate patients on the dangers 
of firearms to children.114 Further, the Legislature found the American 
Academy of Pediatrics recommends physicians include questions about 
firearms in their patient history taking.115 
During the legislative drafting process of the Firearm Owners 
Privacy Act, the bill went through a series of revisions. The first 
Committee Substitute of the original bill in the Florida House of 
Representatives contained language pertaining to both the mental health 
of the patient and whether the possession of firearms would pose an 
imminent danger to the patient or others. The bill read: 
(6) Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
section, it is not a violation for: 
(a) Any psychiatrist as defined in s. 394.455, 
psychologist as defined in s. 490.003, school 
psychologist as defined in s. 490.003, clinical social 
worker as defined in s. 491.003, or public or private 
physician, nurse, or other medical personnel to make 
an inquiry prohibited by paragraph (1)(a) if the 
person making the inquiry in good faith believes that 
the possession or control of a firearm or ammunition 
by the patient or another member of the patient’s 
household would pose an imminent danger or threat 
to the patient or others. 
(b) Any public or private physician, nurse, or other 
medical personnel to make an inquiry prohibited by 
paragraph (1)(a) if such inquiry is necessary to treat 
                                                                                                             
112 Id. 
113 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. 
114 Crim. Justice Comm., Fla. H.R. Staff Analysis, H.R. 0155, at 2 (Mar. 4, 2011). 
115 Id. 
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a patient during the course and scope of a medical 
emergency which specifically includes, but is not 
limited to, a mental health or psychotic episode 
where the patient’s conduct or symptoms reasonably 
indicate that the patient has the capacity of causing 
harm to himself, herself, or others. 
(c) Any public or private physician, nurse, or other 
medical personnel to enter any of the information 
disclosed pursuant to paragraphs (a) and (b) into any 
record, whether written or electronic.116 
Notably, subsection (6)(a) requires a good faith belief that possession of 
a firearm would pose an imminent danger, and not just a vague good 
faith belief that possession of a firearm would be relevant to a patient’s 
medical care or safety.117 
Further, although subsection (b) specifies that it is not limited to 
mental health or psychotic episodes, their specific mention is telling of 
the drafters’ intent. It was wise, though, to not limit the exception only to 
mental health or psychotic episodes. The House of Representatives’ Staff 
Analysis points out that “[i]n certain instances, questions about gun 
ownership may be necessary to the treatment of a patient (e.g., 
psychiatrists treating suicidal patients, emergency room physicians 
treating gun shot victims who need to know the type, caliber, etc. of 
firearm and ammunition used, etc.).”118 Stated differently, the legislative 
history indicates that, to be relevant to a patient’s treatment, the dangers 
associated with gun ownership must be concrete, not abstract or 
hypothetical. 
In fact, the first Committee Substitute of the bill explained abstract 
conceptions of danger do not satisfy the requirements for the exception. 
Following subsection (6) above, a hanging paragraphing stated: 
However, a patient’s response to any inquiry permissible 
under this subsection shall be private and may not be 
disclosed to any third party not participating in the 
treatment of the patient other than a law enforcement 
officer conducting an active investigation involving the 
patient or the events giving rise to a medical emergency. 
The exceptions provided by this subsection do not 
                                                                                                             
116 Firearm Owners Privacy Act, H.R. 0155-01 (Fla. 2011). 
117 Compare Firearm Owners Privacy Act, H.R. 0155-01 (Fla. 2011) with FLA. STAT. 
§ 790.338(2) (2014). 
118 Crim. Justice Comm., supra note 114, at 5. 
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apply to inquiries made due to a person’s general 
belief that firearms or ammunition are harmful to 
health or safety.119 
The former sentence of the hanging paragraph protects patients from 
disclosures such as those authorized under Section 456.057.120 The latter 
sentence clarifies what is meant by phrases such as “good faith 
[belief] . . . would pose an imminent danger” and “necessary to treat a 
patient during the course and scope of a medical emergency.” 
Despite the clarity provided by these provisions, they were not 
written into the final bill. Instead, the Legislature opted to use more 
general language. The specific language may very well have been too 
specific—information regarding firearm ownership or possession may be 
relevant even though the threat or danger is not imminent. Nonetheless, 
the unrefined language of the prior version of the bill provides valuable 
insight into the true intent of the Legislature in passing the Firearm 
Owners Privacy Act. 
C. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida 
After the district court enjoined the State of Florida from enforcing 
several core provisions of the Firearm Owners Privacy Act, the Eleventh 
Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in finding the law 
facially violates the First Amendment and that the law is not 
unconstitutionally vague.121 Finding the law to be a legitimate regulation 
of professional conduct, the Eleventh Circuit stated “[i]t is 
uncontroversial that a state may police the boundaries of good medical 
practice by routinely subjecting physicians to malpractice liability or 
administrative discipline for all manner of activity that the state deems 
bad medicine, much of which necessarily involves physicians speaking 
to patients.”122 
Before addressing the law itself, the court discussed the need for the 
law. It noted there is an imbalance of power in the doctor-patient 
relationship. “When a patient enters a physician’s office, the patient 
depends on the physician’s knowledge and submits to the physician’s 
authority . . . . So when physicians inquire about the presence of firearms 
                                                                                                             
119 Firearm Owners Privacy Act, H.R. 0155-01 (Fla. 2011) (emphasis added). 
120 See supra Part II.C.2. The House of Representatives’ Staff Analysis acknowledges 
HIPAA authorizes disclosure of protected health information to certain entities without a 
waiver or authorization; therefore, if information relating to firearm ownership qualifies 
as protected health information, the law would conflict with HIPAA. Crim. Justice 
Comm., supra note 114, at 5. 
121 Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014). 
122 Id. at 1203. 
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in patients’ homes, some patients may feel that their physicians demand 
an answer.”123 Inside the examination room a patient may feel powerless 
to deny the doctor an answer. 
While the lion’s share of the decision discusses First Amendment 
issues, this note will only address its discussion of vagueness. The 
plaintiffs argued Sections 790.338(1)–(2) are vague because a 
requirement that information be “relevant” to a patient’s medical care or 
safety does not specify whether a physician must make a specific finding 
of relevance for each patient, or whether the firearm information must be 
relevant at the time of treatment or if future relevance is satisfactory.124 
Looking to the plain meaning of the word, the court defined “relevant” as 
“[r]elated to the matter at hand; to the point; pertinent.”125 Determination 
of relevancy, according to the court, must be done on a case-by-case 
basis.126 To make that determination, the doctor must analyze 
particularized information about the patient.127 
The court points out that essential to the issue of relevancy is the 
requirement that the doctor believe in good faith that firearm ownership 
or possession is relevant to the patient’s medical care or safety.128 But, 
the justification the court provides in support of this proposition 
seemingly detracts from the purpose of the law. The court reasoned, 
Thus, a physician may make firearms inquiries of any or 
all patients, so long as he or she does so with the good 
faith belief—based on the specifics of the patient’s 
case—that the inquiry is relevant to the patient’s medical 
care or safety, or the safety of others.129 
Taking this statement to the extreme, a physician could ask all patients of 
a given demographic about their firearm ownership if he or she believes 
that firearms ownership poses an inherent danger to members of that 
demographic. Such interpretation of the law is untenable. The court 
further explained that “[i]f . . . the physician seeks firearm information to 
suit an agenda unrelated to medical care or safety, he or she would not be 
making a ‘good faith’ inquiry.”130 Although the court is correct in that 
inquiring into firearm ownership for the purpose of promoting an agenda 
                                                                                                             
123 Id. at 1214. 
124 Id. at 1227. 
125 Id. (quoting American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1098 (William 
Morris, ed., 1969)) (alterations in original). 
126 Id. 
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would be contrary to the law, it is unlikely that there will be such a clear 
demarcation between promoting an agenda and acting on the belief that 
is the core of the agenda. A doctor who would promote an agenda would 
likely hold strong beliefs about the dangers of firearms. In making the 
inquiry by virtue of the underlying belief, based on the Eleventh Circuit’s 
opinion, the physician would be in accord with the law. 
As for the phrase “unnecessarily harassing,” the court again looked 
to the plain meaning of the words. It explained harass means “[t]o disturb 
or irritate persistently.”131 Similar to other parts of the law, this provision 
is designed to prevent doctors from pursuing an agenda inside their 
offices. The “unnecessarily harassing” provision “communicates that 
health care providers should not disparage firearm-owning patients, and 
should not continue over a patient’s objection or attempt to speak to the 
patient about firearm ownership when not relevant to medical care or 
safety.”132 Additionally, the court explained the modifier “unnecessary” 
“allows physicians the freedom to challenge—i.e., ‘harass’—patients 
regarding firearms when doing so is necessary for health or safety 
reasons if the patient might find the physicians’ advice unwelcome.”133 
This freedom is necessary for instances such as when a doctor is treating 
a mentally unstable patient, and the patient objects to the doctor’s 
inquiries. Not only do physicians have the defense that the harassment 
was necessary, the Eleventh Circuit pointed out that even if a patient 
feels harassed, the patient cannot by himself or herself subject the doctor 
to discipline. A patient can either file a complaint, which will then trigger 
an investigation, or a civil malpractice action. Regardless, the doctor 
need not fear an adverse judgment or professional discipline so long as 
he or she was operating in good faith and the information was relevant 
and necessary.134 
To be brief, the court held the record keeping, inquiry, and 
harassment provisions not void for vagueness. It found “persons of 
‘common intelligence’” would experience no difficulty in interpreting 
and applying the law.135 
                                                                                                             
131 Id. at 1229 (alteration in original) (quoting American Heritage Dictionary of the 




135 See id. at 1230. 
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IV. LESS DISCRETION, MORE EFFECTIVE 
From examining the legislative history of the Firearm Owners 
Privacy Act, it is clear that the Legislature intended the exceptions in 
Section 790.338 be construed narrowly. An expansive reading of these 
exceptions, as done by the court in Wollschlaeger, would render the law 
fruitless. In prior versions of the bill, the exceptions were formulated in 
terms such as “imminent danger” and “mental health or psychotic 
episode.”136 By the law’s final passage, all references to the patient’s 
mental health were removed and replaced with more general language 
referring to the patient’s medical care or safety. 
Even though the Legislature opted to remove the language pertaining 
to mental health, a patient’s mental state should be a prominent factor in 
determining the relevancy of information regarding firearm ownership or 
possession. As previously mentioned, according to the Baker Act, mental 
illness means “an impairment of the mental or emotional processes that 
exercise conscious control of one’s actions or of the ability to perceive or 
understand reality.”137 This note posits that any person unable to exhibit 
control over his or her actions or to properly perceive and understand 
reality is a dangerous person. An innocuous gesture may be perceived as 
a threat, and a threat, no matter how slight, may receive a 
disproportionate response. Not only should healthcare providers have the 
ability to question someone suffering from mental illness about 
ownership or possession of firearms, it would be irresponsible and a 
dereliction of duty to refrain from such inquiry.138 
In a like manner, the phrase “imminent danger” also places the 
patient’s mental state under scrutiny, which could be inferred from 
behavior.139 However, a patient would not need to be mentally ill in order 
to be in a mental state in which he or she poses an imminent danger to 
himself or herself or others. For example, a patient in a state of rage, 
although in control of his or her actions and able to perceive reality 
normally, may pose an imminent threat to others. 
                                                                                                             
136 See supra Part III.B. 
137 FLA. STAT. § 394.455(18) (2014). 
138 This note speaks only of those currently suffering from mental illness, and not of 
people who were once deemed mentally ill but are now healthy. But see Tyler v. 
Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The government’s interest 
in keeping firearms out of the hands of the mentally ill is not sufficiently related to 
depriving the mentally healthy, who had a distant episode of commitment, of their 
constitutional rights”). 
139 Assuming, arguendo, that the danger will be caused by the patient. Of course, the 
patient may also be the victim of violence. Under those circumstances the existence of an 
imminent danger would be evidenced by external factors. 
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Being that both phrases from the prior version of the bill dealt with 
the patient’s mental state, why then did the Legislature ultimately enact 
Section 790.338(2) without any indicator that relevancy requires the 
patient possess a particular mental state? As a reminder, the 
Wollschlaeger court stated that a doctor may direct firearms inquiries 
towards all patients, so long as the information is relevant, based on the 
specifics of the case, to the patient’s medical care of safety. Despite not 
being too vague for constitutional purposes, this interpretation of the law 
leaves doctors with a healthy dose of discretion to apply their personal 
beliefs regarding firearms to their relevancy determinations. Would 
changing the language from “relevant to the patient’s medical care or 
safety” strengthen Section 790.338(2) so that it better effectuates its 
originally intended purpose? 
With regards to the language of the law, there are several phrases 
that the Legislature has previously considered that better tie in a mental 
state component. Limiting inquiries only to times when there is 
“imminent danger” creates risk because some dangers are foreseeable, 
even probable, but not imminent. Likewise, a requirement that the patient 
is mentally ill or experiencing a psychotic episode is too narrow. There 
will be dangerous patients who are fully conscious of their actions and of 
the world around them. In contrast to the Firearm Owners Privacy Act 
and its legislative history, the Baker Act uses a combination of these 
phrases as the criteria for involuntary examination. A patient may be 
taken for involuntary examination if he or she is mentally ill and either 
likely to suffer from neglect and such neglect poses a real and present 
threat of substantial harm to his or her well-being, or there is substantial 
likelihood that the patient will cause serious bodily harm to himself or 
herself or others, as evidenced by recent behavior.140 
Consider if, instead of its present form, Section 790.338(2) read in 
part: 
Notwithstanding this provision, a health care practitioner 
or health care facility that in good faith believes that 
there is a substantial likelihood that the ownership or 
possession of a firearm or ammunition by the patient or 
by a family member of the patient, or the presence of a 
firearm in a private home or domicile of the patient or a 
family member of the patient, will cause serious bodily 
harm to the patient or others in the near future. 
                                                                                                             
140 FLA. STAT. § 394.463(1)(b) (2014). 
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By borrowing the language of the Baker Act, the Firearm Owners 
Privacy Act would more clearly define what is necessary for the inquiry 
to be relevant. Additionally, the language of the Baker Act is time-tested. 
The aforementioned language has withstood judicial scrutiny for over 
twenty-five years.141 
In light of the various terms so far discussed, the substantial 
likelihood of harm exception used in the Baker Act is relatively strong. It 
does not require a weighing of probabilities, nor is it activated by a mere 
possibility of harm. However, it has its limitations. As written, this 
exception is forward-looking only. If a patient presents with a gunshot 
wound, information on the caliber and type of ammunition would likely 
aid the treating physician. Section 790.338(3) creates an exception to the 
general rule for such medical emergencies, but the exception only applies 
to emergency medical technicians and paramedics. Therefore, in order 
for the language derived from the Baker Act to be workable, Section 
790.338(3) would also need to be amended to expand its scope from 
emergency services workers to all healthcare providers. 
While these changes would make the Firearm Owners Privacy Act 
more effective, less invasive changes may be sufficient. To reiterate, the 
problem with the law as currently enacted is that the relevancy inquiry 
leaves physicians too much leeway. If the amount of discretion 
physicians have in making the relevancy determination could be limited, 
the law would be more effective. The law could be improved by 
amending the previously mentioned subsections. But, there is an 
alternative path that offers less resistance. In lieu of revising substantial 
portions of the law, the Legislature should reinstate that portion of the 
hanging paragraph that excludes from the exception those inquiries made 
due to a general belief that firearms or ammunition are dangerous. 
When the law was originally drafted in the Legislature, it had a 
purpose. Now it is better written, but to do that, the exceptions were 
broadened. The phrase “relevant to the patient’s medical care or safety” 
creates a sensible exception, yet gives doctors the ability to exploit a 
loophole. With this loophole, physicians with an understanding of the 
law can act in large part as if Section 790.338(2) does not exist. 
Wollschlaeger states that relevancy must be determined on a case-by-
case basis upon particularized information. Other than that, there is no 
explicit limitation of what type of information will suffice for that 
determination. If the Legislature added language to indicate that “the 
exceptions provided by Section 790.338(2) do not apply to inquiries 
made due to a person’s general belief that firearms or ammunition are 
harmful to health or safety,” the excessive amount of discretion held by 
                                                                                                             
141 See Paddock v. Chacko, 522 So. 2d 410, n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). 
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physicians would be reduced. Thus, it would not fall within the exception 
for a physician to inquire as to firearm ownership for patients given his 
or her belief that the patient is part of an at-risk demographic. 
In short, the Firearm Owners Privacy Act would be most improved 
by amending Section 790.338 so that the exception to the general 
prohibition against inquiries concerning firearm ownership would require 
a good faith belief that there is a substantial likelihood of serious bodily 
harm to the patient or others in the near future. By making substantial 
likelihood of serious bodily harm a sine qua non to the exception, clever 
physicians will be less able to pursue an agenda under the pretext of 
preventive medicine. If, on the other hand, the Legislature were to find 
that such a change would be too radical, the law could still be improved 
by merely adding an explanation that to be relevant, more is necessary 
than a general belief that firearms are dangerous. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Certainly, patients benefit when they can enter a physician’s 
examination room without fear of being harassed or being subject to a 
political agenda. Likewise, physicians have responsibilities that will, at 
times, require them to broach sensitive subjects. The Florida Firearm 
Owners Privacy Act recognizes this dichotomy by both explicitly 
granting patients a right to privacy in regards to their firearm ownership 
and possession, and by carving out exceptions for when that information 
is pertinent to treatment. 
That said, the exceptions are broader than are necessary for 
physicians to provide adequate treatment. Amending the law to phrase 
the exceptions in more specific language will serve to better effectuate 
the law’s purpose by raising the threshold for which the information is 
deemed relevant. What the law should advise the healthcare consuming 
public and physicians alike is that firearm ownership is not intrinsically a 
cause for medical concern. Only when there is an antecedent medical 
diagnosis or indication that a patient may be harmed or harm others, or 
during the course of a medical emergency, should a physician ever 
inquire into firearm ownership or possession. 
Earlier, this note mentioned that the federal government regulates 
healthcare in some ways through Medicare.142 Currently, the federal 
government has no regulations in place that either prohibit or compel 
inquiry into firearm ownership. Nonetheless, the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services contends, “nothing in [the Affordable Care Act] 
prohibits or otherwise limits communication between health care 
                                                                                                             
142 Supra Part II.A.2. 
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professionals and their patients, including communications about 
firearms. Health care providers can play an important role in promoting 
gun safety.”143 This is the sentiment that precipitated the need for the 
Firearm Owners Privacy Act. Florida took the initiative to protect the 
privacy rights of patients, which in turn improves access to and usage of 
healthcare. Let Florida’s system serve as a roadmap for other states that 
wish to put patient care above politics. 
                                                                                                             
143 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Affordable Care Act Implementation 
FAQs – Set 11, http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/aca_
implementation_faqs11.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2015). 
